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This article highlights important stages and choices in the tax incentive process that policy 
makers might find useful in their deliberations. It describes the main steps in the design and 
implementation of R&D tax incentives. The principal aims of tax incentives are reviewed, and 
the preferred forms and administrative mechanism based on international experience are 
considered. Furthermore, the accumulated experience in assessment of the effectiveness of 
R&D tax incentives is summarized, and the advantages and limitations of different assessment 
methods are clarified. 
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1. Introduction 
Due to the contribution that research and development (R&D) makes to long-term 
economic growth and its significant potential for future positive impact on society, 
governments are motivated to find appropriate ways to encourage R&D expenditure. 
Tax incentives are becoming an increasingly important instrument in the policy mix 
to stimulate private R&D in many countries around the world. Over recent decades 
the number of OECD countries promoting R&D tax incentive schemes has rapidly 
increased from 12 in 1996, to 19 in 2006, to 27 in 2012 (OECD 2015a). These vary 
from country to country, depending on their respective economic and industrial 
structure, and the social objectives of the state. 
When considering the implementation of tax incentives, the following questions 
should be precisely answered: 
1. Which activities, industries, and types of firms are to be encouraged? 
2. What forms of tax incentives should be considered? 
3. What will the administrative process be? 
4. What methods will be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the selected 
tax incentives? 
These four questions will be the focus of this review. 
2. Intention of R&D tax incentive policy 
Occasionally, countries seek to develop or strengthen specific industries and in such 
cases tax incentives are devised to benefit the target industry. For example, in Canada 
special federal and provincial tax credits apply to selected industries including 
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interactive digital media, film and television, video game development, and industries 
involved in the development of new technologies addressing issues of climate change, 
clean air, and water and soil quality. Israel provides R&D tax incentives for 
pharmaceuticals, software and hardware development, energy, and utilities (Deloitte 
2015). 
Often countries do not limit eligibility to particular industries, but instead define 
qualifying features of products and services, or designate broad fields to be eligible. 
In Belgium, the company must certify that the aim of R&D is to develop products and 
services that are innovative in the domestic market and will not have a negative impact 
on the environment (or the company has taken steps to mitigate that impact). Ireland 
categorizes activities that qualify for the credit: natural sciences, engineering and 
technology, medical science, and agricultural sciences. In the Netherlands technical 
and scientific research should be conducted in fields such as physics, chemistry, 
biotechnology, production technology, and information and communications 
technology to qualify for R&D tax incentives. 
Additional key aims of introducing tax incentives policies are to provide support 
to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); stimulate cooperation between 
industry and public research institutions and universities; and encourage patenting 
activity. 
Since small business have high innovation potential but greater financial and 
technical constraints, many countries have more generous tax incentives for small 
firms (e.g. Canada, France, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, Norway, Korea) 
(see Table 1). Conversely, countries that provide bigger tax reliefs for large firms (e.g. 
Hungary) put multinational companies in an advantageous position with respect to 
domestic firms. 
Collaboration between universities and industry is critical for innovation and 
technology transfer, skills development, and the generation of new enterprises. As 
such, many countries have adopted policies to stimulate the interaction between 
academia and industry. For example, in France companies can apply existing tax 
incentives for contract research expenses (up to 2 million euro and 3 times the amount 
of other R&D expenses incurred by the company). In Hungary a 200% super 
deduction is available for subcontracted R&D activities if the partner is a public/non-
profit research site. Other countries (Belgium, Italy, Japan) provide more generous 
tax relief for industry R&D projects contracted to universities and public research 
institutes. In Italy tax subsidy increases from 25% to 50% for costs of R&D activities 
outsourced to universities and research centers or to other companies. Meanwhile, 
Japan provides a 30% tax credit (from 8% up to 12% for other eligible R&D 
expenditure) for joint R&D with a university or public research institution, or where 
the R&D is contracted to such entities (Deloitte 2015, OECD 2015c). 
Countries can adopt special tax regimes for intellectual property (IP) to increase 
innovation activities and foster global leadership in patented technology. Furthermore, 
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such regimes can create attractive tax environments for the allocation of IP into the 
country and promote multinational firms to shift their profits from patents that will 
bring additional income to the state in the form of taxes. Given the rapid spread of 
such tax incentives over the last decade their implementation could be a reactive 
measure to maintain tax competitiveness; however, this may result in overall lower 
welfare due to loss of tax revenues. 
3. Design and implementation of R&D tax incentives 
The next question that should be resolved is how to design and implement the best 
policy mix to encourage R&D investment at an appropriate amount to meet economic 
and political objectives. 
R&D tax incentives can take different forms: tax credits, tax allowances, and 
accelerated depreciation associated with investments in R&D. Tax credit allows for 
the deduction of a certain percentage of R&D expenditures from tax liabilities 
(according to the tax credit rate). It may apply to either the absolute value of a 
company’s R&D expenditures (volume-based approach), to the increase in R&D 
spending over a calculated base level (incremental-based approach), or to a 
combination of both. 
The incremental approach is less common as it provides limited or no 
encouragement to businesses whose R&D spending fluctuates or remains at a steady 
level (for instance in times of macro-economic volatility). Moreover, it has higher 
Table 1 Targeted R&D tax incentives 
Country Firm size Activity 
Belgium  Collaboration 
Patenting activity 
Canada SME  
Italy  Collaboration 
Patenting activity 
Japan SME Collaboration 
Korea SME Patenting activity 
Netherlands SME Patenting activity 
Norway SME  
Spain  Patenting activity 
United Kingdom SME Patenting activity 
Ireland  Collaboration 
Patenting activity 
Hungary Large Collaboration 
Patenting activity 
France SME Collaboration 
Patenting activity 
Note: Blank spaces indicate no targeting in these areas. 
Source: own construction based on OECD (2015b) and Deloitte (2015) 
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administrative and compliance costs and may distort R&D investment planning (it 
makes a gradual increase in R&D investment more attractive). 
Thus, many countries over the last few years have replaced their more complex 
hybrid volume and incremental-based schemes with simpler and more generous 
volume-based schemes (for instance, France in 2008, Australia in 2010, Ireland in 
2015). 
 
R&D tax credit in some countries (e.g. Spain and Portugal) is both incremental 
and volume-based, even though either of these tax schemes could be mutually 
exclusive (e.g. Korea). 
Tax allowances enable firms investing in R&D to deduct more from their taxable 
income than they actually spend on R&D. For example, the Netherlands provides a 
super deduction of 160% of qualifying expenses directly attributable to qualified 
research activities. In the United Kingdom small and medium-sized companies qualify 
for a 230% super deduction of qualifying expenses.  
Although there is not a big difference between tax credits and tax allowances in 
the reduction of the after-tax cost of R&D (as they can be made equivalent), tax credits 
have become a more popular measure. This tendency can be explained from an 
administrative point of view. As tax allowances vary with the corporate tax rate, they 
need to be adjusted with these rate changes, thereby causing additional administrative 
difficulty (Lester–Warda 2014). 
As R&D expenditure may precede revenue generated by innovation by several 
years, it is good practice to provide a carry-over facility and the option to receive the 
benefit even in the case of a company not being profitable (cash refunds). This is 
especially relevant for young companies that typically are not profitable in the first 
Table 2 R&D tax incentives by type of tax scheme, 2015 
 Level of R&D Increment of R&D Hybrid 






















 Czech Republic 
Slovak Republic 
Source: own construction based on OECD (2015b) and Deloitte (2015) 
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years of their operation. For example, in France, a volume-based tax credit may be 
carried forward for three years. If it is not utilized within this period, the taxpayer is 
entitled to a refund. Indeed, new companies, young innovative companies, SMEs and 
companies with financial issues can request an immediate refund of unutilized credits. 
 
The United Kingdom provides cash credits for SMEs in a loss position up to 
33.35% of qualifying expenditure. Cash credits are available as well as for large 
companies under the R&D expenditure credit scheme if the company does not have 
corporate tax liabilities. Unused benefits may be carried forward for utilization in 
future periods. In Belgium there is no an immediate refund of tax credit. If it is not 
utilized it can be refunded only after 5 years. 
Where a government seeks to maintain control over the budget allocated to tax 
incentives, it can put a ceiling on the amount that a firm can claim. There are two 
types of ceilings: a cap on the absolute amount of R&D that can be claimed (Australia, 
Norway, Canada), or a cap on the maximum amount of the tax incentive that can be 
deducted (Hungary, Japan, United States, Spain). Limits can be defined as absolute 
amounts or as a percentage. While the presence of an absolute upper ceiling reduces 
the overall cost of support by limiting the absolute amount of R&D expenditure or tax 
relief that a firm can claim, it may also reduce the incentive effect at the margin among 
large firms, which typically have higher levels of R&D. In contrast, proportional 
limits reduce tax support for all eligible firms regardless of their size. For example, in 
Hungary, the R&D tax credit can be applied to reduce up to 80% of tax liabilities. 
Meanwhile, Norway limits the absolute amount of qualifying expenditures. The 
maximum base is 15 million NOK in the tax year for projects based on the taxpayer`s 
own R&D, and 33 million NOK for projects based on R&D purchased from 
institutions approved by the Research Council. In the case of a rapid increase in R&D 
activity, the limiting of the maximum amount of tax relief as a percentage of corporate 
Table 3 Treatment of excess claims by country 
 Carry-forward Refund 















United Kingdom (large companies) 
Austria 
R&D allowances United Kingdom Belgium 
Netherlands 
Slovak republic 
United Kingdom (SMEs) 
Source: own construction based on OECD (2015b) 
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tax liability may reduce the risk of a significant decrease in tax payments and provide 
a certain level of corporate tax revenues. 
Threshold-dependent rates imply a discrete reduction in the size of the R&D tax 
credit or allowance rate once qualified R&D spending surpasses a pre-defined 
threshold amount. For example, in Canada, qualified current R&D expenditure by 
SMEs is completely refundable up to 3 million CAD, whereas above 3 million CAD 
only 40% is refundable (or there may be no refund at all, depending on certain 
conditions). 
Thus, a ceiling is applied by most of the countries that use R&D tax incentive 
schemes and serves to spread R&D budgets over time and over subcontractors, and 
can be an indirect way to target tax incentives based on firm size.  
If countries wish to stimulate at least the base amount of a company’s R&D 
investments they can put a floor on R&D expenditure. This type of limitation is less 
common and used in only a few countries (Australia, Italy). Setting a floor on R&D 
expenditure can have the practical advantage of avoiding administrative costs that are 
high compared to the fiscal incentive, but can put young innovative firms at a 
disadvantage, as they tend to have lower R&D budgets.  
Another popular form of tax incentives is accelerated depreciation provisions for 
R&D capital that allows recovery of the investment more quickly than the underlying 
economic depreciation of the long-lived asset (an immediate, e.g. in Spain, United 
Kingdom, or accelerated write-off of expenditures, e.g. in Belgium, France). 
According to OECD statistics the share of machinery and equipment, and building 
expenditures is about 10% of total R&D expenditure across OECD countries, which 
limits the effect of such incentives (OECD 2017). 
When designing expenditure-based R&D tax incentives eligible expenses must be 
defined. They may include current R&D expenditures or parts thereof (for example, 
wages), capital R&D expenditures or parts thereof (for example, machinery and 
equipment or buildings), and all expenditures for R&D (current and capital). 
Qualifying all R&D tax expenditures enlarges the incentive for companies, but 
increases the public cost of the policy. For example, in Canada only current expenses 
are eligible for tax credit (salaries and wages for employees in Canada, materials, 
overhead and some others). In France eligible expenses include general and 
administrative expenses, depreciation allowances for R&D assets, staff expenses, 
contract research costs, patent costs and costs of technological monitoring, while 
materials used in the research process don’t qualify. Belgium proposes tax credit for 
wages paid to qualifying researchers working on R&D projects (“payroll withholding 
tax credit”). While Spain and France allow accelerated depreciation only for 
machinery and equipment, in United Kingdom and Belgium it is applied for all capital 
R&D expenditures. 
Tax incentives based on the wage bill paid to researchers can be considered better 
practice from the point of view of spillover effects (European Commission 2014). 
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Besides they have a practical advantage in lowering administration and compliance 
costs. 
Government can provide tax incentives in form of a reduced corporate tax rate 
(for example, “Patent box” or “Innovation box” regime). The types of IP that qualify 
for preferential tax treatment vary. For instance, in addition to patents, some countries 
(Hungary, Italy, Spain) include "know-how", trademarks, designs and models as 
qualified IP for tax benefit purposes. 
By combining different schemes, government can achieve several policy goals. 
For instance, the Netherlands offers fiscal incentives on labor costs (WBSO), R&D 
tax allowances for capital costs and certain current costs (consumables), and 
Innovation box. Belgium, in addition, also offers accelerated depreciation for assets 
used in R&D. Thus, some countries simultaneously stimulate R&D investments, 
patenting activity and spillovers. 
After designing tax incentives some important administrative questions should be 
resolved: the necessity of pre-approval of qualified R&D expenditures, and 
requirements for mandatory documentation to support the claim. Sometimes usage of 
pre-approval may be explained by particular features of the R&D tax credit. For 
instance, in Belgium for the application of an R&D investment deduction applied to 
R&D investments beneficial to the environment, the taxpayer must file a claim for 
environmental certification though regional authorities. In Australia, pre-approval is 
mandatory only for activities that will be physically performed outside the country, 
and aims to limit unwarranted shifting of R&D abroad. Most countries don’t require 
initial approval, but oblige firms to maintain supporting evidence (e.g. information, 
records, documentation) in the event of an audit by tax authorities (for example, 
Canada, Check Republic, Japan). Other countries have record keeping substantiation 
requirements only for particular entities, depending on the level of R&D expenses 
(e.g., France) or size of cash refund (e.g., Spain). The absence of approvals mentioned 
above lowers administrative barriers to the utilization of tax incentives, but reduces 
government control of qualifying R&D expenditures. 
4. Evaluation of effectiveness of R&D tax incentives 
When designing R&D tax incentives, policy makers should already clearly identify 
which data will be needed for their evaluation, and how to collect these data. 
Evaluation is essential in monitoring effectiveness of R&D tax incentives. The main 
question that should be answered is: do tax incentives achieve their objectives and to 
what extent? John Clark and Eric Arnold (2005) proposed measuring three types of 
effects (Figure 1). 
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The first- and second-order effects normally arise at the firm level, while third-
order effects happen at the economy or international level. Moreover, all these effects 
can reinforce each other through a feedback loop. 
Since the main objective of expenditure based R&D tax incentives is to stimulate 
private investment, input additionality is a central question. The empirical analysis 
amounts to comparing the tax expenditures with the additional amount of R&D spent 
by private firms. The policy is said to lead to additional R&D if firms spend in excess 
of the amount of tax incentives they receive from the government. The policy is 
clearly ineffective if investment displacement occurs - that is when firms simply 
substitute government tax support for private R&D financing.  
Beyond the induced R&D, there remains the question of whether this additional 
R&D is efficient in generating innovation output (innovation additionality) and 
ultimately improves economic performance and net welfare (macro additionality). 
There are different approaches and methodologies that can be used in the evaluation 
of tax incentive effectiveness (Figure 2). 
Testing for additionality generally involves the computation of the “bang for the 
buck” (BFTB). It is measured by dividing the amount of R&D generated by the R&D 
tax incentives by the net tax revenue loss (tax expenditures or taxes forgone). The 
BFTB is also known in the literature as the “incrementality ratio”, “cost effectiveness 
ratio”, “tax sensitivity ratio” or “inducement rate” (Parsons–Phillips 2007). 
When calculating tax expenditures, one should consider the change in the firms’ 
tax positions, since the tax credits can be taxable themselves (Hall–van Reenen 2000). 
Figure 1 Effects from fiscal R&D incentives 
  
 
Source: own construction based on Clark–Arnold (2005) 
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To isolate the effect of R&D tax incentives on R&D two main approaches can be 
used: 
1. structural modelling approach; 
2. quasi-experimental econometric evaluation approach. 
The structural approach has been adopted by institutions such as the U.S. 
Government Accounting Office (GAO 1989) and the OECD (1997), and it has been 
developed by several authors such as Hall (1993), Mairesse and Mulkay (2004, 2008) 
and Lokshin and Mohnen (2007, 2009).  
This approach involves the two following steps for estimating the effect of the tax 
credit on R&D expenditures: 
1. computation of the impact of the tax credit on the “effective price of 
R&D” faced by the firm, or more generally on the “user cost of R&D 
capital” (actual costs of R&D) for the firm;  
2. specification and estimation of an econometric model that relates the 
changes in the firm’s R&D to changes in the effective price of R&D or in 
the user cost of R&D capital (elasticity coefficient of R&D expenditure 
with respect to the user cost of capital is estimated). 
Structural modelling allows evaluating future reforms and separating short-term 
(1 year) from long-term effects (5-15 years). The necessity of distinguishing these 
types of effects arises due to the fact that induced R&D may take time to show up 
because of adjustment costs in R&D (devising projects, finding scientists and 
engineers, etc.). In addition, the long-term effect may be larger because an increase in 
R&D investments adds to the firm’s knowledge base, thereby increasing the marginal 
payoff of future R&D investments. 
Figure 2 Reconciling evaluation notions 
  
 
Source: Mohnen–Lokshin (2008) 
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A difficulty of the structural approach is in reverse causality between the amount 
of R&D expenditure and the user-cost of R&D (Gaillard-Ladinska et al. 2015). A 
number of R&D tax credit schemes share the characteristic that the size of the tax 
credit is dependent on the amount of R&D performed. The user cost of R&D capital 
thus increases with the level of R&D expenditure, which leads to potential 
underestimation of the effectiveness of the tax credit. In the absence of a social 
experiment or suitable instrumental variable, some studies try to reduce this problem 
by controlling for lagged R&D expenditure and fixed firm effects using a dynamic 
panel data estimator (examples are Baghana and Mohnen (2009) and Harris et al. 
(2009)). 
Quasi-experimental evaluation approach statistically constructs a control group 
and compares the growth rate of R&D expenditure from before to after the policy 
reform, for firms just below and just above the eligibility ceiling. It provides 
convincing ex-post additionality estimates, but unlike the structural approach, it 
doesn’t allow for the simulation of the impact of changes in the features of the tax 
credit. Furthermore, it often makes no distinction between short term and long-term 
effects. 
A comprehensive computation of the effectiveness of R&D tax incentives 
generally requires a full cost-benefit analysis that would compute the total (direct and 
indirect) costs and benefits related to the R&D tax incentive. On the benefit side, it 
would mean not just computing the amount of additional R&D but also the return on 
that R&D. This requires looking into the existence of second-order and third-order 
effects, i.e. the effects on innovation behavior and on an economic performance 
measure like productivity or profitability. Another kind of secondary effect that 
should be included is an increased producer surplus accompanying an expanded R&D 
capital stock. A proper analysis of benefits requires incorporating R&D spillovers 
which can be positive (knowledge externalities or rent) or negative (market stealing 
or obsolescence). 
The main components of costs are: 
1. foregone tax revenues, assessed by taking into account the opportunity 
cost of public funds;  
2. compliance costs of R&D performing firms applying for R&D tax 
incentives (e. g. hiring consultants, accountants, financial experts);  
3. tax administration costs of governmental bodies administering the R&D 
program (e.g. hiring auditors, tax officers). 
The idea of the analysis is not to estimate all of these various elements, but to 
conduct a sensitivity analysis by simulating the benefit-cost ratio using ranges of 
reasonable estimates of R&D, to see what patterns of estimates of the various 
components that matter would produce positive net results. The limits of the approach 
are thus mainly due to very imprecise estimations of these various components.  
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While econometric techniques are well suited to capturing effects that may be 
quantified in a sensible way, they are not appropriate for identifying behavioral 
additionality, i.e. changes in the way firms understand R&D and how R&D decisions 
are made. Here, surveys are a more relevant method. 
After the assessment of R&D tax effectiveness, a government should reach a 
decision on whether a tax incentive scheme should be continued, modified or 
abandoned. Thus, it is necessary to take into account a time gap between the 
introduction of tax incentive and different types of effects arising (particularly, 
second- and third-order effects). Frequent and substantial policy changes are likely to 
strongly reduce the effectiveness of policies – regardless of their design (Westmore 
2013). 
5. Conclusion 
When introducing tax incentives governments should clearly identify the aims and 
possible results of such policy. The policy effectiveness will depend on the design of 
the incentives themselves, administrative mechanism, timely and reliable assessment 
of the effects that will lead to appropriate conclusions, and further improvements. The 
accumulated international experience should be considered. 
By combining different R&D tax incentives schemes, countries may achieve 
several policy objectives such as growth of R&D expenditures, providing support to 
small and medium-sized enterprises; stimulating cooperation between industry and 
public research institutions and universities; and encouraging patenting activity. This 
will provide diversity of available tax incentives and ensure the tax competitiveness 
of the country. When introducing or modifying tax incentives the preference should 
be given to volume-based tax incentives and carry-over provisions. The former will 
be easier to administer for both firms and tax authorities, while the possibility of 
carrying over provisions will provide firms with more flexibility in their investment 
decisions, allowing them to invest in high risk R&D activity with high innovative 
potential. Countries should also take into account that the lower the corporate tax rate 
of a country, the higher the tax support provided in the form of tax allowances should 
be (due to less tax savings), in order to raise their significance. 
The evaluation method of the effectiveness of tax incentives will depend on the 
country-specific context with its particular economic structure, social values, as well 
as accumulated evaluation expertise, and on the data that can be collected. The survey 
is the most common and convenient means, while econometric techniques represent 
a more complicated but objective way to estimate the extent of additionality. 
Tax incentives for encouraging R&D activities 79 
References 
Baghana, R. – Mohnen, P. (2009): Effectiveness of R&D tax incentives in small and 
large enterprises in Quebec. Small Business Economics, 33, 1, 91–107. 
Clark, J. – Arnold, E. (2005): Evaluation of fiscal R&D incentives. Report to CREST 
OMC Panel, Technopolis, September 2005, p. 5 
Deloitte (2015): 2015 Global Survey of R&D Tax Incentives. Deloitte Publishing. 
European Commission (2014): A study on R&D tax incentives. Final report. Working 
papers, no. 52–2014. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Communities. 
Gaillard-Ladinska, E. – Non, M. – Straathof, B. (2015): More R&D with tax 
incentives? A meta-analysis. CPB Discussion Paper, 309, Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis, Netherlands.  
GAO (1989): The research tax credit has stimulated some additional research 
spending, U.S.A., Tax Policy and Administration report. General Accounting 
Office. 
Hall, B. (1993): R&D tax policy during the eighties: Success or failure? Tax Policy 
and the Economy, 7, 1–36. 
Hall, B. – J. van Reenen (2000): How effective are fiscal incentives for R&D? A 
review of the evidence. Research Policy, 29, 4-5, 449–469. 
Harris, R. – Li, Q. C. – Trainor, M. (2009): Is a higher rate of R&D tax credit a panacea 
for low levels of R&D in disadvantaged regions? Research Policy, 38, 1, 192–
205. 
Lester, J. – Warda, J. (2014): An international comparison of tax Assistance for 
research and development: Estimates and policy implications. Working 
Paper, Canada: University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy. 
Lokshin, B. – Mohnen, P. (2007): Measuring the effectiveness of R&D tax credits in 
the Netherlands. Maastricht: University of Maastricht, UNU-MERIT WP. 
Lokshin, B. – Mohnen, P. (2009): What does it take for an R&D tax incentive policy 
to be effective. Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona.  
Mairesse, J. – Mulkay, B. (2004): Une évaluation du crédit d'impôt recherche en 
France (1980–1997). Revue d'économie politique, 6, 747–778.  
Mairesse, J. – Mulkay, B. (2008): The effect R&D tax credit in France (1980– 2003). 
Transparencies presented at the ‘Knowledge for Growth Conference’, 
Toulouse, July 2008. 
Mohnen, P. – Lokshin, B. (2008): What does it take for an R&D tax incentive policy 
to be effective? Presentation to the Expert Group Seminar on Evaluating RD 
Tax Incentives, European Commission, Brussels, October 6, 2008. 
OECD (1997): Fiscal measures to promote R&D and innovation. Paris: OECD 
Publishing. 
OECD (2015a): OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015: R&D 
Tax Incentives. Paris: OECD Publishing. 
80 Katsiaryna Marmilava 
OECD (2015b): R&D Tax Incentives Database. Available: www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-
stats.htm. Date of access: December 2015. 
OECD (2015c): Compendium of R&D tax incentives schemes: OECD countries and 
selected economies. Paris: OECD Publishing.  
OECD (2017): Research and Development Statistics (RDS). Available:  
www.oecd.org/sti/rds. Date of access: May 2017. 
Parsons, M. – Phillips, N. (2007): An evaluation of the federal tax credit for scientific 
research and experimental development. Working paper, 2007-08, 
Department of Finance. 
Westmore, B. (2013): R&D, Patenting and growth: The role of public policy. Working 
Paper, 1047, OECD Economics Department. 
